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SOVEREIGNTY-MODERN: 
A NEW APPROACH TO AN OUTDATED CONCEPT 
By john H. jackson' 
Although much criticized, the concept of "sovereignty" is still central to most thinking 
about international relations and particularly international law. The old "Westphalian" 
concept in the con text of a nation-state' s "righ t" to monopolize certain exercises of power with 
respect to its territory and citizens has been discredited in many ways (as discussed below), 
but it is still prized and harbored by those who maintain certain "realist" views or who 
otherwise wish to prevent (sometimes with justification) foreign or international powers and 
authorities from interfering in a national government's decisions and activities. Furthermore, 
when one begins to analyze and disaggregate the concept of sovereignty, it quickly becomes 
apparent that it has many dimensions. Often, however, the term "sovereignty" is invoked in 
a context or manner designed to avoid and prevent analysis, sometimes with an advocate's 
intent to fend off criticism orjustifications for international "infringements" on the activities 
of a nation-state or its internal stakeholders and power operators. 
In addition to the "power monopoly" function, sovereignty also plays other important roles. 
For example, the concept is central to the idea of "equality of nations," which can be abused 
and, at times, is dysfunctional and unrealistic, such as in inducing "consensus" as a way to 
avoid the "one nation, one vote" approach to decision making in international institutions. 
This approach can sometimes seriously misdirect actions of those institutions; but consensus, 
in turn, can often lead to paralysis, damaging appropriate coordination and other decision 
making at the international level. 
The concept of equality of nations is linked to sovereignty concepts because sovereignty 
has fostered the idea that there is no higher power than the nation-state, so its "sovereignty" 
negates the idea that there is a higher power, whether foreign or international (unless con-
sented to by the nation-state). 
"Sovereignty" also plays a role in defining the status and rights of nation-states and their 
officials. Thus, we recognize "sovereign immunity" and the consequential immunity for vari-
ous purposes of the officials of a nation-state.! Similarly, "sovereign ty" implies a right against 
interference or intervention by any foreign (or international) power. It can also play an anti-
democratic role in enforcing extravagan t concepts of special privilege of govern men t officials. 
Therefore, one can easily see the logical connection between the sovereignty concepts and 
the very foundations and sources of international law. If sovereignty implies that there is "no 
higher power" than the nation-state, then it is argued that no international law norm is valid 
unless the state has somehow "consented" to it. Of course, treaties (or "conventions") almost 
always imply, in a broader sense, the "legitimate" consent of the nation-states that accepted 
• Of the Board of Editors. This article is the basis ofa chapter in a book to be published as an expanded version 
of Professor Jackson's Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures delivered November 5, 6, & 7, 2002, at Cambridge 
University. 
I See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Oem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 41 ILM 536 (2002) (Int'l Ct.Justice, Feb. 14, 
2002) (especially separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula, id. at 597 (in French)). 
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them.2 However, important questions arise in connection with many treaty details, such as 
when a treaty-based intemational institution sees its practice and ')urisprudence" evolve over 
time and purports to obligate its members even though they opposed that evolution.3 Like-
wise, treaty making by various "sovereign" entities can be seriously antidemocratic and other-
wise tlawed.4 
Like treaties, the other major source ofinternationallaw norms, "customary international 
law," is theoretically based on the notion of consent, through the "practiCe of states" and "opinio 
juris."For centuries, practitioners and scholars have debated the impact of customary inter-
national law on "holdout" states, and what constitutes a "holdout," but often in the context of 
rationalizing the notion that consent exists. The ambiguities of these notions are obvious, and 
form part of a broader mosaic of criticism against the very existence of "customary intema-
tionallaw norms."s 
The above remarks do not exhaust the complexity of the "sovereignty" concept. This article, 
however, does not purport to cover all possible dimensions of sovereignty but, instead, focuses 
primarily on what might be thought of as the core of sovereign'ty-the "monopoly of power" 
dimension~although it will be clear that even this focus inevitably entails certain linkages and 
"slop-over penumbra" of the other sovereignty dimensions. This "core" dimension is examined 
in the context of its roles with respect to intemationallaw and institutions generally, and inter-
national relations and related disciplines such as economics.6 
National govemment leaders and politicians, as well as special interest representatives, too 
often invoke the term "sovereignty" to forestall needed debate. Likewise, intemational elites 
often assume that "intemational is better" (thus downplaying the importance of sovereignty) 
and this is not always the better approach. What is needed is a close analysis of the policy frame-
work that gets us away from these preconceived "mantras.,,7 The objective is to shed some light 
on these policy debates or, in some cases, policy dilemmas, and to describe some of the policy 
framework that needs to be addressed. 
2 One classic exception may be the end-of-a-war treaty, at least in some circumstances. In addition, there are 
sticky problems in connection with state succession, including whether the colonial imposition of obligations 
carries over to a newly independent state. 
3 An example of an "evolutionary approach" can be seen in some of Professor Thomas Franck's writings, partic-
ularly, THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATfACKS 8 (2002) 
(noting the evolution of practice regarding the veto power under the UN Charter). See also United States-Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT /DS58/ AB/R, 
para. 130 (adopted Nov, 6, 1998). 
4 E.g.,John H.Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AJIL 310 (1992). 
5 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 816 (1997);jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance 
Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA.]. INT'L L. 369 (2000);]. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight 
of Customary International Law, 40 VA.]. INT'L L. 449 (2000). 
6 This article builds on several other of my published works. John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: 
United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, in POLITICS, VALUES,AND FUNCTIONS: INTER-
NATIONAL LAw IN THE 21ST CENTURy-ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR LOUIS HENKIN 149 (Jonathan l. Charney 
et a!. eds., 1998) [hereinafter jackson, The Great Sovereignty Debate]; john H, jackson, Sovereignty, Subsidiarity, and 
Separation of Powers: The High-Wire BalanCing Act of Globalization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 13 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy &James D. Southwick eds., 2002); 
see also jackson, supra note 4;john H.jackson, The wro Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the 
Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AJIL 60 (1997) (Editorial Comment);JOHNH.jACKSON, WILLIAM]. DAVEY, &AI.ANO. 
SYKES, LECAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CAsES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ONTHE NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL REGUI.ATION OFTRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (4th ed. 2002). This article is also col-
ored by some of my as yet unpublished work, particularly course lectures and the lecture series delivered recently 
at Cambridge University, cited in the asterisked note supra, The Changing Fundamentals oflnternational Law and 
International Economic Law: Perspectives on Sovereignty, Subsidiarity, Power Allocation and International Insti-
tution Building. 
7 John H.Jackson, The WTO "Constitution" and Proposed Reforms: Seven "Mantras" Revisited, 4]. INT'LEcON. L. 67 
(2001) (addressing "mantras" related to the WTO). 
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The subject of this article has been extensively addressed in different kinds of frameworks 
or academic disciplines, many contained in books by political science and international rela-
tions scholars with important insights,S in addition to the many works by legal professionals.9 
However, many of those works focus on how to describe the concept of "sovereignty," how 
it has operated in the past and present in international relations, and how it can be criticized. 
This article addresses a somewhat different question; namely, What, if any, are the valid issues 
raised in the so-called sovereignty debates, and how can we analyze those issues for their future 
impact on policy? 
The importance and need for this type of analytic activity should be obvious, but still merits 
mention. Much has been said and written about "globalization"; despite being an ambiguous 
term of controversial connotation, it is reasonably well understood to apply to the exogenous 
world circumstances of economic and other forces lO that have developed in recent decades 
owing, in major part, to the sharply reduced costs and time required for the transport of goods 
(and services), and similar reductions in costs and time requirements for communication. I I 
These circumstances have led to new structures ofproduction;12 they, in turn, have resulted 
in greatly enhanced (and sometimes dangerous) interdependence, which we can do little to 
remedy and which often renders the older concepts of "sovereignty" or "independence" fic-
tional. Indeed, these circumstances, particularly those of communication techniques here-
tofore unknown, are seen as having dramatic effect on the way governments act internally. 
In addition, these circumstances often demand action that no single nation-state can satisfac-
torily carry out, and thus require some type of institutional "coordination" mechanism. In 
some of these circumstances, therefore, a powerful tension is generated between traditional 
core "sovereignty," on the one hand, and the international institution, on the other hand. 
This tension is constantly apparent, and addressed in numerous situations, some of which 
are poignantly and elaborately verbalized in the work of international juridical institutions 
8 See, e.g., MICHAEL Ross FOWLER &JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW,POWER,ANDTHESOVEREIGNSTATE (1995); THOMAS 
L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUSAND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (1999); THE GREENING OF SOVER-
EIGN1YINWORLD POLITICS (Karen T. Liftin ed., 1998); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGN1Y: ORGANIZED HypOCRISY 
(1999); STATE;SOVEREIGN1Y,AND [NTERNATIONALGoVERNANCE (Gerald Kreijen etal. eds., 2002); STATESOVEREIGN1Y 
ASSOCIALCONSTRUCT (ThomasJ. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); SUBSIDtARl1Y AND SHARED RESPONSIBILI1Y: 
NEW CHALLENGES FOREU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Ute Collier,Jonathan Golub, & Alexander Kreher eds., 1997); 
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH [CEPR],' Making Sense 0/ Subsidiarity, in ANNUAL REPORT: MONITORING 
EUROPEAN [NTEGRATION 4 (1993) [hereinafter CEPR, Subsidiarity]; see also ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER 
CHAVES, THE NEW SOVEREIGN1Y (1995). 
9 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, [NTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995); Marcel Brus, Bridging the Gap Between 
State Sovereignty and International Governance: The Authority 0/ Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNlY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 3. 
10 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at xviii. [n particular, 1 note his interesting comment at that page: 
1 feel about globalization a lot like 1 feel about the dawn. Generally speaking, 1 think it is a good thing that 
the sun comes up every morning. [t does more good than harm. Buteven if! didn't much care for the dawn 
there isn't much I could do about it. 
II Some historical literature claims that at the turn of the previous cent.ury (late 1800s, early 1900s), the world 
was very integrated and, arguably, more freely permitted transactions to cross borders than at present. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey Frankel, Globalization o/thei'-Conomy, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 45 (Joseph S. NyeJr. &John 
D. Donahue eds., 2000). However, the circumstances are vastly dilferent today, particularly in view of the factors 
mentioned in the text, which have an astonishingly different impact on globalization of world society than the 
factors involved one hundred years ago. 
12 For example, the 'Just in time" inventory principles that have been introduced during the last few decades, 
calling for the smooth and efficient operation of communication transport, so that a factory can depend on the 
arrival of needed inputs just in time for production, without having to carry the interest impact of the purchase 
cost as well as the cost of storage. Clearly, recent events involving terrorism are changing that type of view of the 
globalized integration of production. See, for example, in addition to other works cited herein, Ruth Lapidoth, 
jerusalem-Past, Present and Future, 48 REVUE INTERNA TIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 9, 32-33 (1996); Munther J. 
Haddadin, Learning to Share: Divided Sovereignty over Water Resources, HARV. INT'L REv., Summer 1995, at 22; Ruth 
Lapidoth, Redefining Authority: The Past, Present, and Future o/Sovereignty, id. at 8. 
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such a~ the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) .13 In fact, the 
now extraordinarily elaborate jurisprudence of the WT014 exemplifies the tension between 
internationalism and national governments' desires to govern and deliver to their demo-
cratic constituencies, a tension that is also manifested in a large number of international law 
and international relations contexts. 
These considerations suggest the need for further rethinking (or reshaping) of the core 
concept and roles of sovereignty, and for a new phrase to differentiate these directions from 
the old and, some argue, outmoded "Westphalian" model. Inspired by the example of the 
Tate Museum in London, which developed a totally new museum called the "Tate Modern," 
this article suggests that we replace the word "sovereignty" (which Professor Louis Henkin 
wants us to do away with altogether l5 ) with the phrase "sovereignty-modern." This article uses 
the new phrase to indicate the newer approach, which is arguably more pragmatic and more 
empirically based, embracing a more "balanced and balancing" approach for "core sover-
eignty." However, it should be noted that some dimensions of sovereignty other than what are 
here termed "core" might continue to benefit from the traditional approaches to sovereignty. 
But these are not the central subjects of this article. 
Consequently, this article will approach the subject of "sovereignty-modern" in five further 
parts. These parts involve a connected logic; after noting the setting and "landscape" of the 
subject and the ambitions of the article, they proceed (part I) to outline, and remind the reader 
about, the older sovereignty concepts and to survey a small portion of a vast literature of criti-
cisms of these older concepts. Part II then presents this author's views about what elements 
of the traditional sovereignty concepts may remain important in current global circumstances 
and how these "real policy values" need to be recognized and separated from the outmoded 
baggage of older Westphalian sovereignty concepts. Principally (but not exclusively), this arti-
cle focuses on the "policy values" of allocating power to the decision-making mechanism that 
operates with authority and legitimacy. 
Part III then fleshes out some of the policy detail of the "allocation" issues, in the modern 
and global context, with reference to policies that might suggest the need for a higher- or lower-
level allocation of power. 
Part IV briefly presents a group of examples to illustrate the approach suggested by parts II 
and III. These exam pies are purposely drawn from widely different subjects (economic mat-
ters, human rights, the environment, federal entities, etc.) to suggest the potential generality 
of the discussion in parts II and III. The emphasis in part IV on economic subjects reflec~ the 
stronger expertise of this author, but other subject areas are included to suggest their poten-
tial relevance. 
Finally, part V draws some conclusions, including an important underlying theme of the 
article, first articulated in this introduction. This theme not only shows how the rethinking of 
"sovereignty" is necessary to escape the traps of use or misuse of older sovereignty thinking, 
but also challenges certain other key "fundamentals" of " general" international law thinking, 
13 See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE'/URISPRUDENCE OF THE GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREA1Y LAw AND 
ECONOMIC RElATIONS (2000) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE GATT AND THE WTO];JOHN H.JACKSON, THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997); JACKSON, DAVEY, & 
SYKES, sU/JrrLnote 6, ch. 7;John H.Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the wro: EmergingProhlems, 1]. INT'LECON. L. 329 
(1998) [hereinafter Jackson, DiS/JUte Settlement]. 
14 In slightly more than eight years of existence (since Jan. I, 1995), the WTO dispute settlement system has received 
295 complaint~, see Update ofWTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WTO Doc. WT /DS/OV /14 (June 30, 2003), and 
has completed 71 with adopted reports. The total number of pages of the jurisprudence exceeds twenty-two 
thousand, and all informed observers seem to recognize that this is indeed a remarkable achievement, particularly 
when one examines the intricacy and complexity of the cases, and the importance of the analysis and reasoning. 
See, e.g., Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WrODisputeSettlement 1995-2002: A Statistical Analysis, 6].INT'LECON. L. 
251 (2003). 
15 HENKIN, sujn"a note 9, discussed inJackson, supra note 6, at 149. 
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such as the "nation-state consent" requirementofnonn innovation and the notion of "equality 
of nations." 
I. TRADITIONAL WESTPHALIAN SOVEREIGNlY CONCEPTS: OUTMODED AND DISCREDITED? 
The general perception is that the concept of sovereignty as it is thought of today, partic-
ularlyas to its "core" of a monopoly of power for the highest authority of what evolved as the 
"nation-state," began with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. To read the 128 clauses of that docu-
ment is to wade through dozens of provisions dealing with minute details of ending the 
Thirty Years' War, Hi restoring properties to various feudal entities within their territories. It 
is hard to surmise from these any general principle of "sovereignty," but as a "Peace Treaty 
Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective Allies," the 
compact represented the passing of some power from the emperor with his claim of holy pre-
dominance, to many kings and lords who then treasured their own local predominance. As 
time passed, this developed into notions of the absolute right of the sovereign, and what we 
call "Westphalian sovereignty." 
One United States government official has succinctly defined the concept and its problems: 
Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics: First, a sov-
ereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legiti-
mate use offorce within its territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across 
its borders. Third, it can make its foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by 
other.governments as an independent entity entitled to freedom from external interven-
tion. These components of sovereignty were never absolute, but together they offered 
a predictable foundation for world order. What is significant today is that each of these com-
ponents-internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-intervention-is 
being challenged in unprecedented ways.17 
As noted above, a considerable amount ofliterature deals with the issue of "sovereignty" 
and the various concepts to which it might refer. 18 Most of this literature is very critical of 
the idea of "sovereignty" as it has generally been known. One eminent scholar has described 
the sovereignty concept as "organized hypocrisy."'9 Some other authors have referred to it as 
being "of more value for purposes of oratory and persuasion than of science and law.,,20 
Sovereignty has also been explored as a "social construct." According to this view, "N umer-
ous practices participate in the social construction of a territorial state as sovereign, including 
the stabilization of state boundaries, the recognition of territorial states as sovereign, and the 
conferring of rights onto sovereign states.,,21 The approach ofthese authors seems to be that 
16 The "Treaty of Westphalia" is the Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and 
Their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648, available at <http://fletcher.tllfts.edu/multi/ texts/historical/westphalia. txt> 
(visited Mar. 28, 2003). 
17 Richard N. Haass, former ambassador and director of Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, Sover-
eignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for 
Intemational Studies, Georgetown University, at 2 (Jan. 14,2003), transcript available at<http://www.georgetown.edu/ 
sfs/documents/haass_sovereignty_200301 14.pdf>. Ambassador Haass is currently president of the Council on 
Foreign Relations. 
18 See supra note 8, especially CHAVES & CHAVES. 
19 KRAsNER, supra note 8, at 9, where he describes four ways that the term "sovereignty" has been used: 
domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effec-
tive control exercised by those holding authority; interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of 
public authorities to control transborder movements; illterllationallegal sovereignty, referring to the mutual 
recognition of states or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external 
actors from domestic authority configurations. 
20 FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 8, at 21 (quoting QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
277-78 (1968». 
21 Cynthia Weber & ThomasJ. Biersteker, Reconstructing the Analysis of Sovereignty: Concluding Reflections and Direc-
tions for Future Research, in STATE SOVEREIGNlY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 8, at 278, 278. 
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no particular characteristics inhere in the concept of sovereignty, but that its nature depends 
very much on the customs and practices of nation-states and international systems,22 which 
practices could change over time. 
A volume of twenty-five essays concerning sovereignty by more than that number of authors 
was published in 2002,23 again taking a wide variety of critical viewpoints about sovereignty, 
including the far-reaching view of the eminent senior international law scholar and profes-
sor Henry Schermers, who states: 
Sovereignty has many different aspects and none of these aspects is stable. The con-
tent of the notion of "sovereignty" is continuously changing, especially in recent years. 
From the above we may conclude that under international law the sovereignty of States 
must be reduced. International co-operatiorl'requires that all States be bound by some 
minimum requirements of international law without being entitled to claim that their 
sovereignty allows them to reject basic international regulations. 
Thirdly, we may conclude that the world community takes over sovereignty of terri-
tories where national governments completely fail and that therefore national sovereignty 
has disappeared in those territories. The world community by noJ!'has sufficient means 
to step in with the help of existing States and has therefore the obligation to rule those 
territories where the governments fai1. 24 
World leaders and diplomats have added their critical appraisals of older sovereignty ideas, 
while still recognizing the importance of some attributes of the concept. In 1992 the then 
United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali said in his report to the Security Coun-
cil, "Respect for [the state's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity [is] crucial to any common 
international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; 
its theory was never matched by reality."25 
Almost a decade later, after some abject failures by the United Nations to meet apparent 
needs for action and intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, the new secretary-
general Kofi Annan introduced his 1999 annual report to the General Assembly by noting 
that "[o]ur post-war institutions were built for an inter-national world, but we now live in a 
global world.,,26 Secretary-General Annan then expressed impatience with traditional notions 
of sovereignty: 
A global era requires global engagement. ... 
If States bent on criminal behaviour know that frontiers are not the absolute defence; 
if they know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then 
they will not embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereign impunity. 
If the collective conscience of humanity-a conscience which abhors cruelty, renounces 
injustice and seeks peace for all peoples-cannot find in the United Nations its greatest 
tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice. 
22 [d. 
2' STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8. 
24 Henry Schermers, Different A~pects of Sovereignty, in id. at 185, 192. 
25 fu'l AGENDA FOR PEACE-PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING, AND PEACE-KEEPING, REpORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 17 (1992), UN Sales No. E.95.1.15 (1995). 
26 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, quoted in Brus, supra note 9, at 19. 
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Any such evolution in our understanding of State sovereignty and individual sover-
eignty will, in some quarters, be met with distrust, scepticism, even hostility. But it is an 
evolution that we should welcome. 27 
Weapons of mass destruction, genocide, failed states, and rogue states all pose extreme con-
ceptual problems for doctrines of sovereignty. But, of course, an important dilemma develops 
when international institutions do not have the capacity or the will to act to prevent or redress 
such extreme dangers to world peace and security or to particular regions and populations. 
In what circumstances, then, should other entities, including powerful sovereign states, have 
the right or duty to step into the breach? And to what degree is there a requirement to ex-
haust recourse to international institutions before such action? Has the practice of nations 
already begun to develop new norms condoning such a practice?28 
Professor Thomas Franck, perceiving that sovereignty was devolving to the people, asserted 
in his seminal (and ahead of its time) 1992 article in thisJoumal: 
The entitlement to democracy in international law has gone through both a norma-
tive and a customary evolution. It has evolved both as a system of rules and in the practice 
of states and organizations. This evolution has occurred in three phases. First came the 
normative enti~ement to self-determination. Then came the normative entitlement to 
free expression as a human right. Now we see the emergence ofa normative entitlement 
to a participatory electoral process.29 
Some of the discussion and practice about the role of "sovereignty" also focuses on the 
principle of "subsidiarity," which is variously defined, but roughly stands for the proposition 
that governmental functions should be allocated, among hierarchical governmental insti-
tutions, to those as near as possible to the most concerned constituents, usually downward on 
the hierarchical scale. Therefore, some believe that an allocation to a higher level of govern-
mentwould require specialjustification as to why that higher institutional power was necessary 
to achieve the desired goals.30 
In addition, most authors discussing "sovereignty" cite a very large number of "anomaly 
examples"; mainly situations of governmental entities that do not fit into the normal con-
cepts of sovereignty.s, Thus, sovereignty is sometimes divided up or "fractionated," some-
times temporarily, sometimes nominally, for example, to facilitate a diplomatic compromise. 
We have recently seen some indications of this process in the context of negotiations over 
the past few years relating to the Middle East settlement and the status of Palestine.32 
Overall, the concept of sovereignty seems quite often to be extremely, and perhaps pur-
posefully, misleading, and may act as a crutch for politicians and the media to avoid the tough 
and very complex thinking that should be undertaken about the real policy issues involved.33 
27 Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General's Speech to t.he 54th Session of the General A.sembly, UN Doc. SGISMI 
7136 (1999). 
2" MICHAELj. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAw, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AJ.TER Kosovo (2001). 
2" Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democmtic Governance, 86 AJIL 46, 90 (1992). 
~o See text at notes 50-54 infra and cited references. 
31 ROBERTH.JACKSON,QUASI-STATES:SOVEREIGN1Y,INTERNATIONALRELATIONS,ANDTHETHIRDWORLD (1990). 
Krasner, in his hook, supra note 8, elaborately describes many such anomalies, which led him to the title Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy. 
32Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-PLO, 37 ILM ] 251 (1998) (witnessed by President. Bill Clinton); 
see aLso Michael Barnett, :Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Amb State S.vstem, in STATE SOVEREIGNlY 
AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supm note 8, at 148 (containing a remarkahle brief account oflhe history of the "Arab state 
system" and its tensions with Westphalian not.ions of sovereignty). The history of Middle East negotiations, including 
the Wye Plantation discussions, is replete with references to the prohlem of Jerusalem, as well as other prohlems 
that challenge traditional notions of sovereignty with respect to territory, such as shared sovereignty for holy sites 
and allocation of governmental responsibilities, including control of security. 
33 See works cited in note 8 supra. 
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In the area of trade policy, one finds many specific instances of avoidance of "sovereignty 
concepts." A striking example is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) and 
now, the WTO, whose membership is not limited to a "sovereign entity" but, instead, to a 
"State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external 
commercial relations.,,34 
Sometimes the principle of noninterference on the nation-state level is closely linked to 
sovereignty, yet today's globalized world abounds in instances in which the actions of one 
nation (particularly an economically powerful nation) constrain and influence the internal 
affairs of other nations. For example, powerful nations have been known to influence the 
domestic elections of other nations and to link certain policies or advantages (such as aid) 
to domestic policies relating to subjects such as human rights. International organizations 
also partake in some of these linkages, as evidenced by the so-called conditionality of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). 35 
For these and other reasons, some scholars would like to do away with sovereignty entirely. 
Professor Henkin writes, "For legal purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the term sov-
ereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era." But he continues his thought 
by saying, "To this end, it is necessary to analyse, 'decompose' the concept .... ,,36 
This article expresses the view that the complete elimination of the word or concepts asso-
ciated with "sovereignty" would lose some important principles. This observation leads me 
to part II, discussing affirmative attributes of sovereign concepts, and to part III, which devel-
ops the concept of "sovereign ty-modern." 
II. POTENTIALLY V ALID POLICY OBJECTIVES OF SOVEREIGN1Y CONCEPTS 
Sovereignty and the Allocation of Power 
Recognizing that almost no perceptive observer or practitioner is prepared to sign on to 
the full import of the traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty, what can be said in favor 
of modified or "evolving" sovereignty concepts?37 Many, if not most, of the critics of the older 
sovereignty notions recognize, with varying degrees of support, some of the important and 
continuing contributions that the sovereignty concepts have made toward international dis-
course, stability, and peace. For example, Ambassador Richard Haass, formerly director of 
policy planning at the United States Department of State, noted in January 2003: 
Sovereignty has been a source of stability for more than two centuries. It has fostered 
world order by establishing legal protections against external intervention and by offer-
ing a diplomatic foundation for the negotiation of international treaties, the formation 
of international organizations, and the development of international law. It has also 
provided a stable framework within which representative government and market econ-
omies could emerge in many nations. At the beginning of the twen ty-first cen tury, sover-
eignty remains an essential foundation for peace, democracy, and prosperity.38 
34 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XXXIlI, TIAS No. 1700,55 UNTS 194 [here-
inafter GATT); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. XII, in 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTSOFTHE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (1999) [hereinafter WTO Agreement). 
35 Many examples of linkages exist, such as pressures by the European Union for human rights protection in the 
Cotonou Agreement, the Association Agreement with Mrican, Caribbean, and Pacific States. See Elisabeth de Vos, The 
CotanouAgreement: A Case afForced RegianalIntegratian ? inSTATE, SOVEREIGNlY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 8, at 497; see also KRAsNER, supra note 8, at 105 (for other human rights linkages); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER,jEFFREY 
j.SCHOTT, & KIMBERLY ANN EWOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. forthcoming 2004) (foreconomic 
sanctions to promote human rights). On IMF conditionality, see, for example, Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the 
IMF (WfO Relatianship: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AjIL 561, 572-75 (2002). 
36 HENKIN, supra note 9, at 10, quoted inJACKSON, THE GATT AND THE WTO, supra note 13, at 367. 
37 See STATE, SOVEREIGNlY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 282-83. 
38 Haass, supra note 17, at 3. 
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As indicated at the outset of this article, sovereignty is deeply interwoven into the fabric 
of international law, and to abandon, wholesale, the concept of "sovereignty" requires very 
serious thought about a substitute that could efficiently fill the gaps left by its absence. 
An anecdote serves as a good introduction to this section.39 Testifying in 1994 before a U.S. 
congressional committee hearing on the massive Uruguay Round trade agreement and the 
World Trade Organization was the well-known Ralph Nader, who opposed congressional 
approval of that agreement. 40 While I do not accept some of the assumptions and details of 
his statements, there are intriguing aspects that merit respect, including the following: 
A major result of this transformation to a World Trade Organization would be to under-
mine citizen control and chill the ability of domestic democratic bodies to make decisions 
on a vast array of domestic policies from food safety to federal and state procurement 
to communications and foreign investment policies. 
Most simply, the Uruguay Round's provisions would preset the parameters for domestic 
policy-making oflegislative bodies around the world by putting into place comprehensive 
international rules about what policy objectives a country may pursue and what means a 
country may use to obtain even GATT-legal objectives, all the while consistently subordi-
nating non-commercial standards, such as health and safety, to the dictates of intern a-
tional trade imperatives. 
Decision-making power now in the hands of citizens and their elected representatives, in-
cluding the Congress, would be seriously constrained by a bureaucracy and a dispute resolu-
tion body located in Geneva, Switzerland that would operate in secret and without the guaran-
tees of due process and citizen participation found in domestic legislative bodies and COUrts.41 
This and other concerns have led me to take a somewhat different tack in the analysis of so v-
ereignty, rejecting the older Westphalian notions, while recognizing different important aspects 
of sovereignty. 
Broadly, one could see the "antiquated" definition of "sovereignty" that should be "rele-
gated" as something like the notion of a nation-state's supreme absolute power and authority 
over its subjects and territory, unfettered by any higher law or rule (except perhaps ethical 
or religious standards) unless the nation-state consents in an individual and meaningful way. 
It could be characterized as the nation-state's power to violate virgins, chop off heads, arbi-
trarily confiscate property, torture citizens, and engage in all sorts of other excessive and 
inappropriate actions. 
Today, no sensible person would agree that this antiquated version of sovereignty exists. 
A multitude of treaties and customary international law norms impose international legal 
constraints (at the least) that circumscribe extreme forms of arbitrary actions even against a 
sovereign's own citizens. 
So what does "sovereignty," as practically used today, signify? I offer a hypothesis: most 
(but not all) ofthe time that "sovereignty" is used in current policy debates, it actually refers 
to questions about the allocation of power; normally "government decision-making power." 
That is, when someone argues that the United States should not accept a treaty because that 
treaty infringes upon U.S. sovereignty, what the person most often means is that he or she 
believes a certain set of decisions should be made, as a matter of good governmental policy, 
at the nation-state (U.S.) level, and not at the internationallevel.42 
"" I admit that in many ways this incident considerably influenced my thinking about sovereignty. I also testified 
at this hearing. Jackson, The Great Sovereignty Debate, supra note 6, at 174 n.31. 
40 The Uruguay Rnund of the General Agreement on Tarifft and Trade: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
104th Congo (1994), 1994 WL 266499. 
41 [d. (prepared statement of Ralph Nader). 
42 The author previously articulated these concepts inJACKSON, THE GAlT ANDTHEWTO, supra note 13, at 369. 
"Power" is used here similarly to the phrase "effective" or "legitimate authority," although these terms could be 
subject to considerable additional discussion. 
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Another way to articulate this idea is to ask whether a certain governmental decision should 
be made in Geneva, Washington, D.C., Sacramento, Berkeley, or even a smaller subnational 
or subfederal unit of government. Or, when focusing on Europe, should a decision be taken 
in Geneva, Bnlssels, Berlin, Bavaria, Munich, or a smaller unit? 
There are various other dimensions to the "power allocation" analysis. Those mentioned 
above could be designated as "vertical," whereas there are also "horizontal" allocations to con-
sider, such as the separation of powers within a government entity (e.g., legislative, executive, 
judicial) and division of powers among various international organizations (e.g., the WTO, 
the International Labour Organization, the IMF, the World Bank). Indeed, one can go even 
further and note that power allocation could refer to the types of participants involved: gov-
ernmental, nongovernmental (which can embrace issues of government versus private enter-
prises), and so forth. This is obviously a subject that could have widespread relevance, but this 
article will focus on the vertical governmental choices of allocation of power. 
In all those dimensions one can ask a number of questions that would affect the allocation 
issues. Questions oflegitimacy loom large; today there is often a focus on "democratic legiti-
mization," which is frequently meant to challenge more traditional concepts of sovereignty 
(illustrated by views noted in the previous section and related to notions that sovereignty 
is gravitating away from ideas of "sovereignty for the benefit of the nation-state" and toward 
ideas of "sovereign ty of the people,,43). 
Other major topics relevant to vertical allocation issues include the capacity of the institu-
tion at each level to perform the tasks needed to pursue the fundamental policy goals moti-
vating the choices (e.g., market economic efficiency principles, cultural identities, preserving 
peace, subsidiarity concepts, environmental and externalities questions, environmental and 
global commons issues). 
Clearly, the answer to the question of where decisions should be made will differ for differ-
ent subjects. One approach may be appropriate for fixing potholes in streets or requiring 
sidewalks, another for educational standards and budgets, yet another for food safety stan-
dards, and still another for the rules necessary for an integrated global market to work effi-
ciently in a way that creates more wealth for the whole world. Questions of culture and reli-
gion pose further decisional challenges. 
When one reflects on these questions of allocation of power, this issue is easily identified 
as arising in dozens of questions at various government levels. News reports recount activi-
ties related to these questions almost daily.44 
Values Involved in Power Allocation Analysis 
Clearly, many values or policy objectives could influence consideration of the appropriate 
level or other (horizontal) distribution of power within a landscape of governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions. A small, illustrative group of these policies is outlined below. 
Reasons for preferring guvemmental action at an intemationallevel. Many reasons could be given for 
preferring an international-level power allocation, including what economists call "coordination 
43 Franck, supra note 29; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNlY [ICISS), 
THE REgPONSIBIIJ1YTO PROTECf 11 (International Development Research Centre, 2001); Schermers, supra note 24. 
44 As an exercise verifying this proposition, the author, with very able student research assistance, formulated 
a chart of the many news and other reports that touch on these allocation-of-power questions at various levels of 
government. This report involves too many instances to include in this article, butwe could make it available to inter-
ested persons. As an example, one can examine the Financial Times (London) for May 12, 2003, which in this single 
issue touches on seven or more topics of "allocating power or authority"; they include the United Kingdom's 
consideration of joining the euro single currency, the role of international law in cases of unilateral use of armed 
force, European Union measures relating to carbon emissions, testing requirements for chemicals, the control 
of Iraqi oil exports, WTO rulings related to steel taritIs, and ideas for a European common defense fund. 
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benefits,,,45 sometimes analyzed in game theory as the "Prisoners' Dilemma."46 In this situa-
tion, if governments each act in their own interest without any coordination, the result will be 
damaging to everyone; whereas matters would improve if states assumed certain, presumably 
minimal, constraints so as to avoid the dangers of separate action. Likewise, much has been 
said about the "race to the bottom" in relation to necessary government regulation47 and the 
worry that competition between nation-states could lead to a degradation of socially importan t 
economic regulation. 
Economists sometimes suggest that the upward placement of government decision making 
is particularly needed where there is so-called factor mobility, such as investment funds or per-
sonal migration. This is partly because governments find it more difficult to tax or regulate in 
an effective way in the face offactor mobility.48 
The subject area ofthe environment directly engages these issues of power allocation. Issues 
involving the so-called global commons, where actions that degrade the environment have 
"spill-over effects," illustrate the need for higher supervision.49 
Many other subject matters are very controversial and remain unresolved in this regard. 
For example, at what level should competition policy (monopoly policy) be handled? What 
about human rights, or democratic values and democratic institutions? Questions oflocal cor-
ruption or cronyism might seem to call for a higher level of supervision. 
Allocatingpowermore locally; the principle of " subsidiarity. "Advocates of subsidiarity (a concept 
much discussed in Europe) note the value of having government decisions made as far down 
the "power ladder" as possible. Historically, subsidiarity derives partly from Catholic philos-
ophy of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.50 Among the various policy values that 
it involves,51 one of the basic ideas is that a government closer to the constituents can better 
reflect the subtleties, necessary complexity, and detail embodied in its decisions in a way that 
most benefits those constituents. As one politician has said, "Those who know your name are 
most likely to know your needs."52 
Likewise, it is often said that the decision making that is furthest down the ladder and closest 
to the constituent will be policed by a greater sense of accountability. Indeed, many illustra-
tions of the dangers of distant power come to mind, including, of course, the origins of the 
United States in its rebellion against England in the eighteenth century. Similarly, colonialism, 
45 Cary Coglianese, Glnbaliwtion and the Design ofInterrwtionallnstitutions, in GOVERNAl'!CE IN A GLOBAUZING WORLD, 
supra note II, at 297, 298-300. 
4'; Robert O. Keohane, International Relations, Old and New, inA NEW HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 462, 469 
(Robert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 1996). 
47 John H.Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. INT'LEcON. L. 3 (2000). See also 
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Daniel C. Esty & Damien 
Geradin eds., 2001); and articles in 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 215-385 (2000). 
48 RONALD W.JONES, GLOBALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF INPUT TRADE 135 (2000). 
49 William C. Clark, Environmental Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD, supra note II, at 86. 
50 For a succinct overview of the history of the concept of subsidiarity, with mention of sources that go back as far 
as Aristotle and a sixteenth-century book by the political philosopher Johannes Althusius, leading to nineteenth-
and twentieth-century Catholic social thought, including the papal encyclical QuadragesimoAnno (fortieth year) 
in 1931, see Thomas Stauffer, Subsidiarity as Legitimacy? in World Bank Institute, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
and Local Financial Management Program, topic 3 (july 26-Aug. 6, 1999), at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/ 
publicfinance/ documents/stauffer.pdf>; see also Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law, 97 AJIL 38 (2003). 
51 CEPR, Subsidiarity, supra note 8; see also Carozza, supra note 50 (a remarkably full account and history of the 
concept of subsidiarity, which elaborates an argument for its importance in the context of applying international 
human rights obligations, somewhat counter to the approach of many human rights advocates who argue that human 
rights norms are "universal"). 
52 George W. Bush, Campaign speech made to the Annual Convention of the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures in Chicago (july 18, 2000), quoted in Lisa B. Song, Bush Pushes More State, Local Control of Schools, CHI. TRIB.,July 18, 
2000, Metro §, at 1 (online ed.), available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File; transcript of entire speech available at 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-decOO/stump_7-20.htmb(visitedSept.11. 2003). 
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particularly twentieth-century, post-Second World War colonialism53 and the move to decol-
onize, raised a number of these issues. Decisions made remotely from constituents often become 
distorted to accommodate the decision makers' goals, which are local to their own situation 
and institution, and are not made to accommodate the targeted "beneficiaries."54 
As a counterpart to European subsidiality, an enormous amount of discussion about "feder-
alism," which really engages these same issues, takes place in the United States. There is a 
worry that decisions taken "inside the beltway" often neglect the facts and details "on the 
ground" in local areas, partly to accommodate the particular, relatively selfish goals of some 
senators or other members of the U.S. Congress. Indeed, during the last decade, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has been paying a great deal of attention to "constitutional federalism," and 
one must ponder whether the Supreme Court's attitudes are wholly based on an appropriate 
view of the U.S. Constitution, or are at least partially motivated by policy considerations (not 
necessarily inappropriate ones) about ~here power should reside.55 
Some other policy goals and values supporting both directions. At times, the con troversy over the 
level on which to place a government decision is truly a controversy over the substance of an 
issue. Thus, national leaders will use international norms to further policy that they feel is 
important to implement at their own level but is difficult to do because of the structure of 
their national constitution or political landscape. Likewise, other leaders may want to retain 
power over certain issues at the national or even the subnationallevel, because they feel they 
have more con trol at those levels in pursuing the policies that they favor. These issues do raise 
the question of attempts by power elites to bypass democratic procedures that annoy them. 
Another policy that can urge allocation both up and down the ladder is the policy of pre-
venting a governmental institution from misusing power. Thus, those who wish to have govern-
mental decisions made at a higher level, such as at the international level, must also consider 
the potential misuse of power that could occur in international institutions. The often inferior 
effectiveness ofthe constraints on international institutions to those on national institutions 
(e.g., lack of elections) may be the core of an argument against placing power at the higher 
level. On the other hand, power clearly can also be misused at lower levels of government. 
Likewise, tllere is generally a "separation of powers" principle that could apply. The U.S. Con-
stitution has, as its centerpiece, the separation-of-powers principles to avoid monopolies of 
power, which then lead to misuse. Such separation can be as between various relatively "equal" 
levels of governmental action, or as between higher and lower levels of governmental action. 
For example, in considering how governments should make decisions, it may be determined 
that only a portion of a certain power should be allocated to the higher level, reserving to a 
lower level some powers that would be used to check the higher level. To some extent, the im-
plementation of treaties, without having direct application in domestic legal systems, is po-
tentially such a check against power at the higher level. But allocation of greater power to the 
higher-level treaty may also check lower-level misuse of power.56 
Another aspect of the decision involving the allocation of power is the policy goal of "rule 
orientation" regarding the matter concerned. Particularly for economic purposes, a rule sys-
tem that provides additional clarity, security, and predictability can be very significant, par-
ticularlywhen the subject matter involves millions of entrepreneurs ("decentralized decision 
making" as part of the market system). Thus, part of the consideration regarding on what level 
to place governmental power might deal with whether different levels have different abilities 
53 Gerard Kreijen, The Tmnsfrrrmatian ofSauereignty and African Independence: No Shmtcuts to Statehood, in STATE, SOVER-
EIGNW, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supm note 8, at 45. 
54 SeeTlP O'NEILL& GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS Is LOCAL (1994). 
5[. See generall)' Mark Tushnet. Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA LJ. II (2000) (and 
noted references); see also infra note 73 and corresponding text. 
56 Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, Gtobalizatian and Public Administmtion Reform, in GoVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING 'NORLO, 
sujmt note II, at 229, 250. 
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to make an effective rule-oriented program. Of course, this question raises a risk inherent in 
internationalism in the minds of some, who may view with suspicion a rule system's method 
of interpreting treaty text. 
III. THE POWER ALLOCATION POLICY ANALYSIS: A CORE ApPROACH? 
A Fuzzy Road Map of the Policy Landscape 
On the basis of the analysis in the previous sections, we can now see that a key question is 
how to allocate power among different human institutions. It is probably not surprising that 
this question is very complex. Many factors must be considered, some of which are discussed 
below. To some extent, they center on a common question of "power," and therefore, in some 
ways, this question relates to virtually all of government and political science studies, as well 
as, e.g., international relations, economics, and law.57 When one has to develop the landscape 
of this policy analysis, one recognizes that a huge number of specific substantive policies play 
a part, as well as what we might call "procedural" or "institutional" policies (how to design the 
appropriate instituti0!1s) .58 Some of these policies typically do not converge in the directions 
they would suggest that allocation of power should take. That is, differing policies often pose 
dilemmas for policymakers, where they must engage in a certain amount of balancing. 
Indeed, the policy landscape is so complex that one may question whether it is possible to 
arrive at any worthwhile generalizations. It could be argued that because of this complexity 
each case has to be decided suigeneris, or on a "case by case" basis (to use a phrase often in-
dulged in by juridical institutions). Nevertheless, this article will attempt some restrained and 
constrained generalizations, more in the manner of a road map or inventory/checklist of 
the type of subjects and factors that are to be considered. 
Outlines of the Landscape and Its Dimensions 
As mentioned above, over time there developed a number of so-called sovereignty fictions, 
which have never really represented what goes on in the real world. One of these fictions is 
the notion that absolute power is concentrated at the head of a nation-state, and we have seen 
extensive literature criticizing the myths and anomalies regarding that. In analyzing how to 
allocate power, we have mentioned different dimensions such as vertical versus horizontal allo-
cations. With respect to the horizontal allocation, we would look at important concepts such 
as the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution, whereby power is allocated among legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches."!) Similar considerations apply at the international 
level, between functional divisions within an international organization and between different 
international organizations. 
The characteristics of institutions are very important to handling the issues of allocation, 
and must be examined carefully. The nature of the issues involved must also be examined. 
What types of information and expertise are needed for certain kinds of substantive issues? 
Is the institution to which power will be allocated, regarding those issues, capable of finding 
and processing that information? Does it have adequate means at its disposal to carry out its 
mission? And if not, what roles will other levels of institutions play? 
[,7 See supra note 44. 
',8 Coglianese, supra note 45. 
59 Another aspect of opposing categories comes into play here, although [ will not develop that velY much in this 
article; that is, the allocation of power as between government institutions (at all levels and among different hori-
zontally equal institutions), on the one hand, and nongovernment institutions (private enterprises, nongovern-
mental organizations, pro bono institutions, etc.), on the other hand. This portion of the analysis would push one 
into questions of market-oriented economic structures and their value, as well as their limitations. 
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The capacity of a treaty-based international institution to implement activities designed 
to achieve internationally agreed-upon goals will clearly also be part of an analysis as to where 
to allocate power. If an allocation to the international institution is not accompanied by ade-
quate means to operate effectively, this deficiency could suggest reasons for not so allocating 
power. But the reverse could also be true (as mentioned in the introductory pages above): 
nation-states may find that economic or other exogenous circumstances render nation-states 
that act unilaterally ineffective, thus manifesting a greater need for international approaches. 
In addition, many of the issues about democratic legitimacy come into play when one is allo-
cating power at different levels and to different horizontally equal institutions. Issues that 
may call for different kinds of allocations include, e.g., taxes, expenditures for public goods 
and services, and regulation of private sector agents. 
Comparing International Institutions with National and Subnational Institutions: The Devil in the Details 
There are a series of factors that policymakers trying to develop an appropriate allocation 
of power must consider about international institutions. The following is just a beginning 
checklist: 
(1) Treaty rigidity, namely, the problem of amending treaties and the tendency of trea-
ties to be unchangeable, although actual circumstances (particularly in economics) are 
changing very rapidly. 
(2) International organization governance questions, particularly with respect to choos-
ing officials of the international organization. Governments tend to push favored candi-
dates, to claim "slots," and to disregard the actual quality of the individuals concerned 
or the nature of the tasks they are to assume. 
(3) International organization governance in the decision-making processes. What 
should the voting structure be? Should consensus be required? What are the dangers of 
paralysis because of the decision-making procedures? What are the dangers of decision-
making procedures that are likely to be considered illegitimate or out of touch with reality? 
This factor relates to the fiction of "sovereign equality of nations" and the problems 
of a one-nation, one-vote system. It can be argued that these tvvo concepts, or fictions, 
are very antidemocratic, as compared to a system that would recognize the populations 
or other weights concerned in the representation and the organization. Is it fair that 
a ministate ofless than fifty thousand inhabitants should carry the same weight in a voting 
structure as giant governments of societies that have more than one hundred million 
constituents each? Does giving the ministate such weight accentuate possibilities of 
"holdout" bargaining, what some call "a ransom"? Is it fair that a voting majority ofU nited 
Nations members today could theoretically encompass less than 5 percent of the world's 
population?60 
( 4) In ternational di plomacy techniques. To what exten t is it appropriate or necessary 
that there be special privileges for diplomats, such as tax freedom and other immunities? 
Do such privileges in the context of international organizations' decisions tend to result 
in actions that are out of touch with citizen beneficiaries? 
(5) International diplomacy as it operates substantively, sometimes in contrast to or 
in diminishing a rule-oriented structure, through power-oriented bargaining. 
60 When my assistant and I examined a list of all the United Nations nation-states and ranked them from those 
with the smallest population to those with the largest population, and then counted from small upward until we 
passed the midpoint, so that we had a majority of the UN nation-states, we learned that the total population of that 
majority (rdnked from the smallest upward) amounted to less than 5% of the total population orall of the nation-
states that are UN members. Likewise, when we do this with a slightly larger list of all nation-states and include some 
that are not UN members, we get the same result. I wish to acknowledge the able assistance of Ms. Woqjung Kim, 
J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, for the study relating to this footnote. 
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(6) International governmen tal issues that relate to the allocation of an in ternational 
organization's resources, such as a "headquarters mentality," devoting large amounts of 
the budget to the perquisites and comfort of the headquarters personnel. 
(7) The impact ofa dispute settlement system and its jurisprudential techniques such 
as those used to "interpret" international agreements. 
(8) The constitutional "treaty-making" authorities of different levels of government. 
One can also examine the effect of the "direct application" or "self-executing nature" of 
treaties, and ask whether the treaties were made with a legitimate amount of democratic 
input, such that they should be allowed to trump nation-state-level democratic and par-
liamentary institutions.6l 
(9) Comparison with governance questions at the nation-state or local level, such as 
how officials are chosen, the amount oftransparency and participation allowed, and the 
resources available to undertake tasks. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that, in many cases, individually insignificant details are 
involved in how institutions perform their tasks, which, however, when added up, or utilized 
by a large number of participants, can have a degrading effect on the efficiency or fairness 
of operations. 
Legitimization in the Power Allocation Analysis 
By now the reader may have an inkling that some important fundamental principles of 
legal and normative legitimization are relevant to the power allocation analysis. Arguably, 
almost the entire analysis of power allocation outlined in this part so far could be based on 
traditional sovereignty and nation-state-consent principles. The detailed questions on power 
allocation leave open perhaps the most important question, Who (what entity) should decide 
the power allocation?It is possible (and probable) that today many will say that the nation-state 
will decide in each case, for itself, whether it is willing to allocate "its own sovereign power" 
either up the scale or downward. (In the latter case certain checks are likely to be retained in 
the hands of the sovereign.) After all, for any treaty-based rule, it is plausible to say that each 
nation will decide, and if it decides to accept the treaty obligations, its consent has legiti-
mized its obligation. 
The issue of customa',y international law is more ambiguous, of course, and thus, often more 
controversial.62 Certainly, rather extravagant claims are frequently made about what newcus-
tomary norms have come into being, as compared with the traditional international rules of 
such norm formation (e.g., practice plus opinio juris), which more strongly emphasize state 
consent. Questions arise in either case. Is the ultimate decision about allocation put in the 
hands of an internationaljuridical or diplomatic institution? Does such an institution have 
certain biases or conflicts of interest? To pursue this line of analysis as a basis for a new alloca-
tion of power, however, may stretch some of the traditional international law concepts of state 
consent. Some examples of the outer limits of consent include: 
(1) A nation finds that its trade or financial welfare requires it to accept a major complex 
treaty because most of the rest of the world has done so (e.g., via the WTO or IMF). 
(2) The UN or other major charter is deemed so fundamental that its interpretation 
of obligations (considering treaty rigidity constraints against amendment) "evolves" or 
is influenced by developing "practice under the agreement" in unexpected (or impos-
sible to expect) ways. Specific decisions of the institution may "validate" this evolution, 
either explicitly or impliedly, although the decisions may not always be broadly accepted 
61 See, e,g.,Jackson, supra note 4. 
62 See, for example, the powetitil criticisms of customalY internatinnallaw by Bradley & Goldsmith, sll/JTa note 5; 
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 5; Kelly, supra note 5. 
HeinOnline -- 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 797 2003
2003] SOVEREIGN1Y-MODERN: A NEW APPROACH TO AN OUTDATED CONCEPT 797 
(or acceptable), or could in fact be "bad policy" by relatively objective standards. Elites 
may weigh heavily in certain of these processes, as may certain special interest groups 
(business or nonbusiness, sometimes with single-issue objectives). 
(3) Voting rules and procedures may result in anomalies that lead to decisions that do 
not reflect a membership as a whole. Various pressures may be placed upon voting nations 
through favors or "vote buying." An individual nation-state may have no particular inter-
est in the vote on an issue, and thus be willing to "hold out" (ransom its vote) or swap its 
vote on this issue for one on some completely different and irrelevant issue. The votes of 
many small nations may control in a situation oflittle interest to them. Votes of nations 
belonging to certain groups may be controlled or guided by single institutional mech-
anisms, which thereby have great weight. The European Union, for example, has fifteen 
(going on twenty-five) votes in the WIO, and many more that it can influence through pres-
sures related to its association agreements. 
In reflecting on the experience of many national or international human institutions, one 
finds there is nothing new in the examples mentioned above. What is new, however, is the 
degree to which these international institutional circumstances have an impact on nation-state 
governments trying to deliver the fruits of their important achievements to their constituents. 
The other side of these considerations is that they may be outweighed by the "coordination" 
benefits realized through the cooperative action of international instit~tions. Indeed, in this 
context scholars and other observers have argued that the nation-states participating in such 
institutions have enhanced their sovereignty by leveraging it through joint action.63 
Clearly, in some cases, however, the "state consent" theory extended in the above paragraphs 
will not carry the legitimization far enough to be broadly persuasive. This limitation could apply 
in particular to issues of humanitarian intervention (especially in cases of inaction by relevant 
international institutions), and potentially to some issues regarding terrorism and weapons 
of mass destruction. A core of cases is being recognized by world leaders and scholars as not 
satisfactorily solved by "consent doctrines." This is where the sovereignty revisionist theories 
have teeth, and where, in this author's opinion, confusion and uncertainty reign, and possible 
"auto-determination" by overreaching unilateral nation-state decisions poses a serious risk 
to some traditional concepts of sovereignty, as well as to "rule-based" objectives for interna-
tional relations. 
IV. EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT POWER ALLOCATION PROBLEMS 
The analysis outlined in the previous parts can also be applied to various subjects and en-
deavors, keeping in mind, however, the caveats that were also mentioned above. 
Thus, it is logical at this point to provide examples applying some of the principles pre-
sented. An extensive discussion of a long list of examples would be possible elsewhere, but 
time and space requirements permit only a few illustrations for purposes of this article. I will 
focus here on predominantly economic subject areas, and follow those examples with some 
general summary comments about the potential for more extensive elaboration in other con-
texts and fora. 
Economics and Markets 
As a "thought experiment," consider the following. 64 
Advocates of market economics argue that the most efficient process of decision making 
in an economy is reliance on the private sector to handle most of the choices, and to keep the 
63 Brus, supra note 9, at 18; see also leISS, supra note 43, SUPPLEMENTARVVOLUME, at 129. 
64 For a previous article on the economic analysis of power allocation, seeJohn H.Jackson, Global Economics and 
International Economic Law, 1]. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (1998), 
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government out. However, there is the well-recognized exception of "market failure,,,65 and 
thus it becomes necessary to analyze what such failure entails. 
Often, categories of market failures include monopolies and competition problems, lack 
or asymmetries of information, public goods and free rider problems, and externalities. In 
each of those cases, one can see how the economics of a globalized, economically interde-
pendent world operates. It is quite likely that in some cases, an analyst could make one kind 
of judgment about the existence of market failure by looking only at the nation-state level, 
but come to a different conclusion when appraising the global or international level. Monop-
olyjudgments will depend somewhat on how one defines the "relevant market." Are borders 
truly open, and thus does a single producer within a nation-state really have to face compe-
tition? Does that producer not have monopoly power? Asymmetries of information are found 
across national borders, particularly where the cultures and languages are different. 
Even ifajudgment is made as to the existence of market failure, leading to a government 
response, the kinds of government responses possible at the nation-state level differ dramat-
ically from those at the international level. Most often, the international-level institutions 
do not have powers that can effectively tax, subsidize, or materially alter market mechanisms 
(such as by setting up tradable permits). Another governmental response is to maintain rules 
and prohibitions. This is virtually the only available government response at the international 
level, and it raises an important practical question as to whether a particular rule or prohibi-
tion will in fact be effective (i.e., followed), and therefore operate efficiently to correct the 
market failure. 
International Rules on Competition Policy: An Active Debate 
There has been much bitter fighting, at least in discourse, about whether an international 
competition policy or set of rules-an international competition policy for things like monop-
oly and antitrust-should be put in place. Quite a disconnect separates the United States 
and the European Union on this question. In Europe, the Brussels institutions, at least, have 
expressed a strong desire for policy at the international level (EU member states may be less 
interested in this). In the United States, the idea has provoked considerable opposition. Orig-
inally, the United States said there was no real need for it. Subsequently, however, even the 
United States has appeared to be softening, as evidenced by the constitution ofa special com-
mission several years ago (the International Competitioll Policy Advisory Committee, or 
IePAe) to study this issue. IePAe issued a nuanced repodm that said at least one thing clearly: 
each year, more and more U.S. antitrust cases involve an international aspect. This develop-
ment, together with the emerging trend that suggests a need for a response to market failure, 
leads some to argue for at least minimal policy coordination at the international level. 
The WTO and Its "Constitution": Impact of Institutional Detail 
The World Trade Organization can become a major illustration of principles outlined in 
this article.51 Certainly, one of the more intricate and elaborate (and some say controversial) 
examples of power allocation principles can be witnessed in relation to the WTO. Globaliza-
tion and the problems that accompany it are forcing institutions to adapt or the creation of 
1i5 See, e.g., RICHARD LIpSEY, PAUL COURANT, DOUGLAS PURVIS, & PETER STEINER, MICROECONOMICS, pt. 4, at 207 
(l2th ed. 1998). 
66 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FINAL REpORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
AssISTANr ATTORNIc"YGENERAL FOR ANTITRUST (2000), available at <http://www.uscloj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm>. 
67 See WTO Agreement, sujJra note 34. See also the following works by this author: THE GAIT AND THE WTO, 
supra note 13; THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 13; Dispute Settlement, supra note 13; The wro "Constitution" 
and Proposed Rejonns, supra note 7. 
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institutions that can cope. Clearly, many ofthese problems relate to treaty clauses that pene-
trate deeply into a nation-state's "sovereignty" decisions about economic regulation. Thus, 
any international cooperative mechanism will, of necessity, clash with national "sovereignty," 
and with special national interests whose own economic well-being will be affected by the 
international decisions. Not surprisingly, therefore, the WTO not only is a candidate for fill-
ing institutional needs to solve current international-level problems, but also is a target cur-
rently under attack. 
Nevertheless, as noted in previous parts of this article, increasingly often nation-states can-
not regulate effectively in the globalized economy, and this inability is particularly relevant 
to economic factors that are global and mobile (investment, monetary payments, and mone-
tary policy, and even free movement of persons). As outlined by very eminent economists in 
recent decades (such as Douglass North and Ronald Coase68 ), markets will not work unless 
there are effective human institutions to provide the framework that protects the marketfunc-
tion. Therefore, the core problem is the globalization-caused need to develop appropriate 
international institutions. If a thorough analysis led to the conclusion that the WTO is a good 
place in which to concentrate some of these cooperation activities, one could see the WTO 
becoming essentially an international economic regulatory level of government. This pros-
pect, of course, is scary to many people. 
The "VTO plays two major, and somewhat conflicting, parts with respect to the power allo-
cated to it. On the one hand, it moderately enhances the institutional structure for negotiat-
ing and formulating rules, and changing them as needed for the conduct of international 
trade and certain other economic activities at the in~ernationallevel. On the other hand, 
the WTO operates an extraordinarily powerful dispute settlement system, which is basically 
unique in international law history. This system has rare characteristics for an international 
institution: mandatory jurisdiction and submittal to its procedures, as well as an appellate pro-
cess that was established to try to achieve a higher degree of coherence and rationality in 
the rules of the massive treaty clauses applying to the WTO's subject competence. One can 
immediately see a series of power allocation issues, not only as between nation-states and the 
WTO, with regard to its two different parts, but also allocation as between those parts. In addi-
tion, intricate details69 can have very substantial effects on the real power allocation impacts 
that occur. 
The Broader Agenda 
As indicated earlier in this article/o the possible number of applications of the principles 
noticed above is myriad. I briefly mention a few here, to stimulate thinking about them, but 
also to point out that the analysis suggested is applicable to many different subject areas (and 
different levels of government). 
(1) Environmental policies deeply engage many of the policy principles. Certain "global 
commons" issues cannot be successfully managed at the nation-state level. On the other 
hand, certain localized environmental problems involve delicate trade-offs in allocating 
scarce resources and are possibly best managed 10cally.71 
68 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw, ch. 5 (1988) (reprint of 1960 article); DOUGlASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
69 See, e.g., BRINK LINDSEY & DAN IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE DEVILISH DETAn~~ OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW 
(2003) . 
70 See note 44 and text at notes 42-44 supra. 
71 DOUGlAS IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 53 (2002) (and citing Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Knleger, Economic 
Growth and the Environment, 110 Q.J. ECON. 353 (1995»; see UNITED NATIONS, REJ'ORT OFTHE WORLD SUMMIT ON 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002), UN Sales No. E.03.II.A.1, available at <http:// 
wwwJohanneshurgsummit.org/html/ documents/documents.htlll\>. Readers will note that no organization was 
established. See also Steve Charnovitz, A World cl/Viron1llent Organization, 27 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2002). 
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(2) Human rights are closely related to the policy matrix and, arguably, different human 
rights may call for different power allocations. 72 
(3) Many of the large number of United Nations activities can be a subject for the power 
allocation analysis, and even peacekeeping missions and uses of force could at least partly 
benefit from such analysis. 
(4) The debates in Europe on a new constitution are riddled with power allocation 
arguments.73 
(5) The U.S. government (at all levels) is constantly struggling with the issues of power 
allocation, as Supreme Court cases and congressional debates testify (regarding control 
of education, environmental regulation, and regulation of commerce, to mention only 
afew).74 
V. PERCEPTIONS AND REFLECTIONS: CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 
The proposition tentatively put forth in this article is that for the "core sovereignty" con-
cepts, which mostly involve the nation-state's monopoly of power and its logical derivative of 
state-consent requirements for new norms, the power allocation analysis, when explored more 
profoundly, can help overcome some of the "hypocrisy" and "thought-destructive mantras" 
surrounding these concepts so that policymakers can focus on real problems rather than myths. 
This analysis can thus help policymakers weigh and balance the various factors to reach better 
decisions on questions such as accepting treaty norms, dispute settlement mechanisms and 
results, necessary interpretive evolution of otherwise rigid treaty norms, and even in some cases 
new customary norms of international law. 
Such an analysis recognizes that there are desiderata in sovereign ty concepts other than the 
"core" power allocation issues, and that even as regards the core issues there are clearly cases 
that the world must resolve by explicit (or well-recognized implicit) departures from traditional 
sovereignty concepts. Taken together, these considerations can be labeled "sovereignty-mod-
ern" and suggest that further analysis and discussion would help build some new "handholds 
on the slippery slopes" loomingjustahead of certain issues not resolved by traditional sover-
eignty, as the world faces major risks of uncertainty, miscalculations in diplomacy, and over-
reaching by certain nation-states. 
The follow-up question becomes: What are some theories or principles that could reach 
beyond the traditional sovereignty parameters but offer some principled constraints to avoid 
the risks just listed? Several can be mentioned. 
One possibility would be to recognize certain international institutions as the legitimate 
entities to decide on some of these parameters. This approach would require that such an 
institution seriously discuss these limits and modes of activity (without a tilt toward that insti-
tution's "turf"), and that it develop these limits with enough precision to be useful to national 
and international decision makers. This seems to be more carefully done in juridical institu-
tions, which might well be an argument for more reliance on such institutions. However, 
"checks and balances" are needed regarding those institutions, lest they go wrong through 
72 FRANCIS JACOBS & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 2002). "Margin of 
appreciation" is close to a concept of "deference" to another (lower?) level of government. Sometimes this oper-
ates as a "standard of review," particularly in court proceedings. Ill. at 21 O. The U.S. Sllpreme Court's" Chevron doc-
trine" in judicial review of administrative determinations is another example. 
73 See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, Eumpe's Policymakers Live in the Real World, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at 5 (editorial); Daniel 
Dombey & George Parker, Plan for a New c.urope 'Will Last 50 Years, 'FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 4; The Future of the 
European Union: Can These Bones Live? ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 51; British Prime Minister Tony Blair, A Clear 
Course for Europe, Keynote Speech, Cardiff, Wales (Nov. 28, 2002), transcript available at <http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/PageI739.asp>. 
74 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,111-12,141-42 (2000). 
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faulty analysis, lack of adequate empirical information, or their frequent remoteness from the 
real world activities that are relevant to reasoned and just opinions. 
Another possibility is to follow a chain of reasoning, developed by some scholarly analysis, 
that traditional "sovereignty" concepts themselves must evolve and be redefined. This avenue 
might also be pursued by juridical institutions, with the same caveats as mentioned above 
and throughout this article. "Sovereignty of people," rather than governments, is sometimes 
mentioned in this context. 
Another, and probably more heroic, possibility is to develop a general theory of sources of 
international law based on what some authors have called the "international community.,,75 
To some this implies a sort of" acquis communautaire."76 It could well imply participation by 
nongovernmental persons and entities, and it could embellish the more traditional concepts 
of "practice" under agreements or apinio juris, to stretch those frontiers. The risk and problem 
is the imprecision, and thus the controversy, that can develop about the use of this approach 
in specific instances. It has been invoked in some situations, such as the Kosovo crisis," with 
the phrase "overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe." 
Yet another approach is to use the concept of "interdependence," often most associated 
with economic policy and activity, to justify certain new norms. In many of these cases, this 
concept can probably be used in tandem with more traditional sovereignty and nation-state-
consent approaches to persuade nations to give such consent. Frequently, a key question, 
however, is the holdoutstate, which in some economic circumstances is given added incentives 
to hold out when other states are constraining their reach for policy and economic advantages. 
The approach of this article has been to respond to the many extensive challenges and crit-
icisms of the concept of "sovereignty" by urging a pause for reflection about the consequences 
of discarding that concept in broad measure. Since sovereignty is a concept fundamental to 
the logical foundations of traditional international law, discarding it risks undermining inter-
national law and certain other principles of the international relations system. Doing so 
could challenge the legitimacy and moral force of international law, in the sense of what Pro-
fessor Franck terms the "compliance pull"78 of norms backed by characteristics of legiti-
mization. It seems clear that the international relations system (including, but not limited to, 
the international legal system) is being forced to reconsider certain sovereignty concepts. But 
this must be done carefully, because to bury these concepts without adequate replacements 
could lead to a situation in which pure power prevails; that, in turn, could foster chaos, mis-
understanding, and conflict, like Hobbes's state of nature, where life is "nasty, brutish, and 
short.,,79 In the alternative, this vacuum oflegitimization principles could lead to greater aggre-
gations of hegemonic or monopolistic power, which might not always be handled with appro-
priate principles of good governance.so 
Thus, one of the recommendations of this article is to disaggregate and to analyze: break 
down the complex array of "sovereignty" concepts and examine particular aspects in detail 
and with precision to understand what is actually at play. A m~or part of this approach is to 
understand the pragmatic functionalism of the allocation of power as between differen t levels 
of governance entities in the world. To the extent feasible, this should be done in a manner 
not biased either in favor of or against international approaches. Indeed, as time moves on 
75 Don Greig, 'International Community; 'Interdependence' and All That . .. Rhetorical Correctness? in STATE, SOVER-
EIGNlY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 521, 563-66. 
76 Greig, supra note 75, at 563-66. 
77 Id. 
78 Franck, supra note 29, at 5 I. 
79 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshotted., Collier Books 1962) (1651) ("[In a state of nature 
there are] no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."). 
80 Robert O. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1 (2001). 
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and the world continues to experience trends toward interdependence and the need for coop-
erative institutions that can also enhance peace and security, the substitute for portions of 
nation-state sovereignty will probably be international institutions that embrace a series of 
legitimizing "good governance" characteristics, such as some of those recommended by Robert 
Keohane81 and other thinkers and philosophers. Among those,characteristics one can expect 
a broader set of participants thanjust nation-states, but also nonstate and nongovernmental 
bodies and individuals, including economic (business) actors; moral, religious, and scholarly 
entities; and international organizations. Those characteristics will likely include elements 
of "democratic legitimization" and some notions of "democratic entitlement," not only for 
nation-states, but also for international institutions. Validating characteristics will also likely 
include elements of efficiency and the capacity to carry out appropriately developed institu-
tional goals and to build in techniques for overcoming "treaty rigidity" so that the institutions 
can evolve to keep up with the changing world. It is more and more probable that a juridical 
institutional structure of some kind will be seen as a necessary part of any such international 
institution, and that the use of force or other concrete actions impinging on local societies will 
be constrained by the institutional and juridical structures. This is, in essence, a "constitu-
tional" approach to international law. Thus, international lawyers must "morph" into consti-
tutionallawyers. 
To cope with the challenges of instant communication, and faster and cheaper transporta-
tion, combined with weapons of vast and/or mass destruction, the world will have to develop 
something considerably better than either the historical and discredited Westphalian concept 
of sovereignty, or the current, but highly criticized, versions of sovereignty still often articu-
lated. That something is not yet well defined, but it can be called "sovereignty-modern," which 
is more an analytic and dynamic process of disaggregation and redefinition than a "frozen-
in-time" concept or technique. Even then, a "sovereignty-modern" power allocation analysis 
may not always be the only appropriate approach to analysis of the many problems listed in 
this article. It needs to be considered a valuable analytic tool, but not one that can always lead 
to an appropriate resolution to such problems. When used in tandem with other policy tools, 
including realistic appraisals of the political and legal feasibility of various policy options, 
itcan be a valuable means to sort through elaborate and complex policy "landscapes." There 
is much thinking yet to do, and no one ever said it was going to be easy. 
81 [d. 
